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Since the enactment of the Statute of Anne over three centuries ago, copyright laws have struggled to
maintain functionality, credibility, and relevance in the face of technological change. Although its grant is
limited to “original works of authorship” and technological inventions and other useful articles are
expressly excluded from its purview (17 U.S.C. §102), copyright law is nevertheless implicated in the
ways we design and implement technologies to create, interact with, and share the cultural and
intellectual works it is intended to foster. While copyright law provides a regulatory framework intended to
stimulate the progress of science and the useful arts (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8), a more realistic
assessment might suggest that the true, unacknowledged legislators of the world are technologists (P.
Duguid (personal communication, Jan. 16, 2014) citing Shelley, 1890, p. 46). How might we better
understand the complex, often murky, relationship between copyright law and technological change? And
how should courts and lawmakers respond to technology-enabled behaviors that seem both socially
beneficial and infringing under existing law?
This research contemplates tensions arising at the intersection of copyright law and technological
change and envisions an emerging theoretical framework based upon sociological theories of deviance.
Beginning with some general observations on the relationship between copyright law and new
technologies, the introduction identifies and describes some of the key policy challenges in this area.
Section two considers judicial applications and adaptations of existing fair use doctrine to emerging,
arguably deviant, technology-enabled copyright-related behavior leading to an in-depth discussion of an
exemplar, HathiTrust’s mass digitization project. Finally, section three engages sociological literature on
technological change and deviance and begins to articulate a theoretical framework for re-conceptualizing
the interplay between copyright law and emerging technology based upon social disorganization theory
and Robert Merton’s concept of innovative deviance. By offering a glimpse into the phenomenon via this
new lens, this research hopes to deepen understandings of the relationship between copyright law and
technological innovation, and enrich existing discourse on this topic, particularly with respect to mass
digitization.

1

Introduction

Under U.S. law, copyright is a creature of the state, “not an inevitable, divine, or natural right that confers
on authors the absolute ownership of their creations. It is designed rather to stimulate activity and
progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the public” by granting authors a limited monopoly
over their original creations. (Leval, 1990, p.1107) The philosophical underpinnings of the current system
are thus based on the utilitarian tenet of maximizing net social welfare. (Fisher, 2001; Merges, 2011)
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Copyright’s means-end formulation, which presupposes that people may be disinclined to create or
innovate unless rewarded with a concomitant right to exploit the fruits of their labor, has deep historical
roots. For example, we see precursors as far back as the Leviathan (1651) where, in laying out his social
contract theory, Hobbes famously argued that “there is no place for industry” in a lawless world “because
the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; … no account of Time; no Arts; no
Letters; no Society.” (Hobbes & Tuck, 1996, p. 89) A few short decades later, England enacted the
world’s first copyright law, commonly called “The Statute of Anne” (1710), and it too was based on an
essentially identical premise, plainly evident from its official title: “An Act for the Encouragement of
Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the
Times therein mentioned.”
Implicit in the law’s means-end formulation, however, is the assumption that methods of
reproduction and dissemination are costly. While this may have been the case in centuries or decades
past, the premise no longer holds true. Technological developments including the advent of the Internet,
the creation of technical protocols and standards, and improvements in digitization now enable content to
be moved rapidly, at relatively low cost, and without significant degradation. Changes in information
technology have consequently altered copyright-related behaviors and norms in fundamental ways. New
methods of creating, organizing, managing, disseminating, and engaging with existing works have
emerged. As these behaviors increasingly supplant traditionally sanctioned means of creation and
innovation, questions and concerns arise regarding the propriety and lawfulness of emerging behaviors
as well as the existing copyright regime’s ability to effectively regulate them amidst rapid technological
change. (National Research Council, 2013)
Recent developments in information technology abet a miscalibration of the law made manifest
through the new, often transgressive, copyright-related behaviors they enable; this miscalibration has, in
turn, generated a flurry of interest in copyright reform. Maria Pallante, the Register of Copyrights, recently
observed: “The copyright world, which once had predictable and even pristine demarcations, has
morphed dramatically” as a result of recent technological developments and, on this basis, “some
recalibrations” of the existing legal framework may be required (2012(a), p. 339; 2012(b)). In last few
years the Copyright Office has solicited requests for comment, held roundtables, and released reports on
a range of issues including, for example, the copyright implications of mass digitization (U.S. Copyright
Office, 2011). Additionally, in 2013, the Department of Commerce’s Internet Policy Task Force released
a report on Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the Digital Economy and the National Research
Council released a report on Copyright in the Digital Era: Building Evidence for Policy. In 2014, the
Berkeley Center for Law and Technology hosted “The Next Great Copyright Act,” a symposium at which
Pallante delivered a keynote calling for comprehensive copyright reform. Consensus is building among
academics, policy-makers, and stakeholders that legal reforms are a necessary response to recent
technological changes.
Despite consensus that reforms are needed, there is much disagreement around what shape
potential reforms should take. Rights holders and their advocates characterize copyright’s miscalibration
as under-restrictive and complain that existing laws fail to effectively prohibit a host of activities which
seem neither to respect the limited monopoly of rights holders nor stimulate artistic creativity for the
common good. Readers, users, and public interest advocates on the other hand characterize the
miscalibration as over-restrictive and argue that existing laws prohibit behaviors that promote the purpose
of copyright at little to no observable detriment to rights holders. Innovative technologists are concerned
that intellectual, creative, and technological potential might be unnecessarily restricted by hidebound
copyright laws seemingly bent on over-rewarding the incumbent beneficiaries of a prior technical regime
at the expense of new-comers. Members of established industries meanwhile caution that the law’s
miscalibration introduces uncertainty into the system of cultural production, consumption, and
participation, making it difficult for stakeholders to assess risks and make sound economic decisions.
The numerous and vociferous participants in current copyright policy debates have done little to
help elucidate a policy solution for the challenges posed by recent technological developments. In fact,
the current discourse, plagued by partisan discord, may be undermining the possibility of finding a
solution more than facilitating it: “[T]hese disruptive changes have given rise to a strident debate” in the
public discourse around copyright reform, characterized by “rhetorical excess,” a “climate of
recrimination,” and “an unwillingness to engage in rational discourse” over copyright law’s proper scope
and role with respect to technological innovation and creative expression. (Samuelson, 2010; National
Research Council, 2013) Compounding the problem, the debate is poorly informed by independent
empirical research: “Instead of asking, ‘What is the research-based evidence?’ partisans tend to rely on
claims of and evidence marshaled by stakeholders.” (National Research Council, 2013, p. 2) This tactic
2
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has been described by one commentator as “stirring up moral panics” intended to short-circuit critical
thinking on copyright issues and undermine participants’ ability to identify and evaluate the real issues at
stake in copyright policy debates over new technologies and emerging copyright-related behaviors.
(Patry, 2009)
While comprehensive copyright reform of the kind advocated by Pallante and others may be
stymied by the unrelenting tumult of copyright policy debates, courts continue to consider and adjudicate
disputes in this area. The following section explores one particular collision involving copyright and
technological change and considers the promise and challenges of judicial recalibration of copyright law
by stretching an existing doctrine, fair use, to fit the contours of an emerging technology-enabled
behavior, mass digitization.

2

Fair Use and HathiTrust’s Mass Digitization Project (“MDP”)

2.1 Existing Fair Use Doctrine
The doctrine of fair use serves as an important limitation on an author’s exclusive rights by allowing “the
public to draw upon copyrighted materials without the permission of the copyright holder in certain
nd
circumstances” (Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 95 (2 Cir. 2014)). As the Supreme Court
commented, fair use is essential to the Act’s overriding goal:
“From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted
materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts …’” (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. at
574 (1994)).
Fair use requires a court to weigh together four nonexclusive factors in assessing whether a
particular use is fair (17 U.S.C. §107): (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work, including whether it is primarily creative or instructive (which copyright tends to value and seek to
foster) or primarily factual (in which the law of fair use recognizes a greater need to disseminate); (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, including
whether the secondary use employed no more than was necessary to effectuate any valid purpose under
the first factor; and (4) the effect of the use upon the market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Some examples of fair use arising from prior litigation include:
•

•

•

•
•
•

Book reviewers and biographers quoting from an original work in order to illustrate a point and
substantiate criticism (Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass 1841); Wright v. Warner
nd
Books, Inc., 953 F. 2d 731 (2 Cir. 1991));
Artists using copyrighted photographs in a new work that uses a fundamentally different artistic
nd
approach, aesthetic, and character from the original (Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2 Cir.
2013));
Internet search engines displaying low-resolution thumbnails of copyrighted images in order to
direct users to the website hosting the original (Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d
th
th
1146, 1165 (9 Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818-822 (9 Cir. 2002));
Viewers recording a television broadcast for later viewing (Sony Corp. of Am. V. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-450 (1984));
Competitor copying protected software for purposes of reverse engineering (Sony Comp.
Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599-601 (2000));
Company digitizing unaltered student essays for use in connection with plagiarism detection
software (A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639-640 (2009)).

Driven by a concern that fair use cases were too often “adjudicated upon ad hoc perceptions of
justice without a permanent framework,” Judge Pierre Leval first proposed “transformation” as a cogent
governing principle for fair use determinations in his seminal article, Toward a Fair Use Standard (1990).
The landmark case, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (1994), was the first time the Supreme Court
applied a transformation analysis to a fair use determination and, since that decision, courts have
increasingly focused on whether the purpose and character of a secondary use is transformative:

3
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“A use is transformative if it does something more than repackage or republish the
original copyrighted work. The inquiry is whether the work ‘adds something new, with a
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message …’” (Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 2014, p. 96 quoting Campbell v. AcuffRose, 1994, p. 579 citing Leval, 1990, p. 1111).

2.2 Description of the Mass Digitization Project (“MDP”)
Beginning in 2004, several major research libraries agreed to allow Google to digitally copy books in their
collections as part of Google’s Library Project, one piece of the larger Google Books Project. The specific
terms of the agreements varied by institution and most remain cloaked under conditions of confidentiality
1
however, based on Google’s agreement with the University of Michigan , made public under that state’s
freedom of information laws, we know Google scanned that library’s books, gave the library a digital copy
(consisting of both an image file and text file), and retained an identical digital copy for inclusion in its own
searchable electronic database (UM-Google cooperative agreement, 2004). As a result of significant
technical advances in optical character recognition, indexing, and search algorithm design, Google
generated high-quality machine-readable, fully indexed and searchable texts from print materials at a
scale previously unmatched. The Library Project also signaled an important re-contextualization of the
role of academic research libraries with respect to the ways in which cultural and intellectual works are
managed, organized, and shared, experienced, studied, and understood.
In 2008, thirteen universities launched HathiTrust, a partnership united around the common goal
of ensuring that the cultural record (primarily vis-à-vis the Google scans) is preserved and accessible. As
of January 1st, 2015, the HathiTrust Digital Library (“HDL”) has over 100 partner institutions and a corpus
of over 13 million volumes. 38% of HDL’s total volumes are known to be in the public domain and digital
copies of these works are made available to HathiTrust members and visitors to the HDL website.
HathiTrust treats the remaining more than 8 million in-copyright volumes differently
(http://www.hathitrust.org).
HathiTrust permits three uses of the copyrighted works in the HDL. First, all visitors to the HDL
website are allowed to conduct full-text searches of the entire corpus. If a work is in-copyright and the
copyright holder has not authorized broader use, the search results show only the page numbers
containing the search term and its frequency per page. Unlike Google’s service, HDL does not display
any text or “snippets” from the underlying copyrighted work. Second, HathiTrust member institutions can
opt-in to HDL’s enhanced access for patrons with certified print disabilities which makes the entire corpus
(public domain and in-copyright works) readable via adaptive technologies. Third, HathiTrust permits
members to create a replacement copy of a work for purposes of preservation in accordance with §108 of
the Act (Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F.Supp.2d 445, 458 (Dist. Court, S.D.N.Y. 2012).

2.3 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust
In September, 2011, twenty authors and authors’ associations (“Authors Guild”) sued HathiTrust, Cornell
University, and the presidents of the Universities of Michigan, California, Wisconsin, and Indiana
University (“HathiTrust”) for copyright infringement, asserting that the systematic digitization of
copyrighted materials without authorization violates authors’ exclusive rights. (17 U.S.C. §106)
HathiTrust conceded that the Authors Guild established a prima facie case of infringement with respect to
certain works but defended its activities on the basis of fair use.
2.3.1 District Court decision
The district court ruled in HathiTrust’s favor, finding that the three uses HathiTrust permitted with respect
to the HDL were transformative fair uses. The court’s rationale was primarily motivated by “the goal of
copyright itself, whether ‘promoting the Progress of Science and useful Arts would be better served by
allowing the use than by preventing it’” (Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 2012). After acknowledging that
central purpose of the transformative use analysis is to determine “whether the new work merely
supersede[s] the objects of the original creation … or instead adds something new, with a further purpose
or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message” the court concluded
HathiTrust’s uses were transformative “because the copies serve an entirely different purpose than the
originals” citing HDL’s full-text search’s enabling of “new methods of academic inquiry such as text
mining” as an example (Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 2012, p. 459-460).
1

University of Michigan was one of the original “Google Five” partner institutions in the Library Project and was the lead architect of
HathiTrust.

4
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The district court’s fair use analysis ends on a somewhat unusual note, transitioning from the
dispassionate and impartial rhetoric characteristic of most court opinions to Judge Baer’s personal,
almost confessional, reflections on the case:
“Although I recognize that the facts here may on some levels be without precedent, I am
convinced that they fall safely within the protection of fair use (…). I cannot imagine a definition
of fair use that would not encompass the transformative uses made by Defendants’ MDP and
would require that I terminate this invaluable contribution to the progress of science and
cultivation of the arts that at the same time effectuates the ideals espoused by the ADA” (Authors
Guild v. HathiTrust, 2012, p. at 464) [emphasis added].
2.3.2 Circuit Court decision
The Authors Guild appealed and the second circuit affirmed the district court’s holding with respect to fulltext search and improved access for print-disabled individuals; they were deemed fair uses. (The court
vacated the lower court’s holding with respect to preservation because it found that the Authors Guild
lacked standing to bring the claim (Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 2014, p. 104)). Despite reaching the
same ultimate result with regard to the HDL’s full-text search, the court disagreed with the lower court’s
transformation analysis:
“Contrary to what the district court implied, a use does not become transformative by making an
‘invaluable contribution to the progress of science and cultivation of the arts.’ Added value or
utility is not the test: a transformative work is one that serves a new and different function from
the original work and is not a substitute for it” (Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 2014, p. 96 quoting
Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 2012, p. 464).
The court then concluded that the creation of a full-text searchable database is a “quintessentially
transformative use” because the results of the search are “different in purpose, character, expression,
meaning, and message” from the original work from which it is drawn (Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 2014,
p. 97).
Likewise, the court took issue with the lower court’s transformation analysis with respect to HDL’s
improved access for print-disabled patrons: “providing expanded access … is not ‘transformative’”
because it does not “add something new to the copyrighted work” (Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 2014, p.
101). Furthermore, the court concluded that HDL’s purpose in improving access was no different from
the purpose of the original works; transformation requires more than simply enabling a new audience to
read a book. While the court declined to find HDL’s improved access transformative, it nevertheless
found it to be a non-infringing fair use because HDL took no more than was necessary to effectuate its
valid purpose and did not harm the potential market for the original because, sadly, the virtual nonexistence of a market for handicap-accessible books necessarily forecloses the possibility of harm.

2.4 Discussion of the Case
As a policy matter, Authors Guild v. HathiTrust reached the right result because the potential harm to the
Authors Guild is minor and speculative compared to the tremendous benefits to the general public, as
well as the grievously underserved print-disabled community, demonstrated by the HDL. Also noteworthy
is the care with which the judiciary considered the impact of new technology not just in terms of the three
specific uses at issue in the case, but also in terms of how emerging technology-enabled behaviors are
conceptualized within the framework provided by existing doctrines, precedent, and copyright’s overriding
goal:
“The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors…When technological change
has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this
basic purpose” (Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 2012, p. 453-454).
But this case also reflects the previously discussed miscalibration or mismatch between the goal
of copyright law and the available means for achieving the goal under existing law. The following subsections address a few of the challenges and limitations inherent in the courts’ attempts to stretch existing
doctrine to fit the contours of emerging technology-enabled behaviors.

5
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2.4.1 Something New
The first issue raised by the courts’ rationale in Authors Guild v. HathiTrust is essentially doctrinal: HDL’s
full-text search functionality fails to meet the “adds something new” requirement under traditional
transformative use analysis. HDL’s full-search function adds societal value because, as the courts noted,
it can facilitate research particularly with respect to data-mining, but it achieves this functionality by
masking off the entire contents of the protected work save the search terms provided by users and the
relevant pages numbers. It is not clear how this masking off alters the original works by adding “new
expression, meaning, or message.” Removing original expression seems to be the precise opposite of
adding new expression. Moreover, while users and data-miners may use the search results to
subsequently generate new meaning or message or create information, insights, or understandings with
respect to the original works, HDL’s search service does not. Full-text search is a technological tool,
albeit one that has tremendous value and use to society as the courts noted, but it does not transform the
original works by adding something new as required by existing fair use doctrine. The circuit court
purported to corrected the district court’s analysis on this point when it noted that making an ‘invaluable
contribution to the progress of science and cultivation of the arts” is not enough to transform an infringing
use into a fair one. A careful review of the circuit court’s own reason, however, casts doubt on whether it
was ultimately able to push beyond the “value to society” rationale in a meaningful, doctrinally-supported
way.
Supporting its decision, the court cited two transformative fair use decisions from other circuits.
The first case found a search engine’s use of low-resolution thumbnail images to facilitate search
functionality to be a fair use (Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 2007). The second case found a company’s
digitization of student essays for use in connection with anti-plagiarism detecting software to be a fair use
(A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, 2009). These cases are analogous to Authors Guild v. HathiTrust
in the sense that each involves behavior that would constitute mass copyright infringement but for the
application of a technological tool that, when combined with existing works, produces tremendous benefit
to society despite failing to meet the “adding something new” requirement of traditional transformative fair
use jurisprudence.
These cases highlight a potentially important disconnect between the core transformative use
cases, which deal with expressive or creative works, and an emerging sub-set of transformative use
cases, which deal with the technical manipulation of existing works to enable the emergence of new facts
and information about those works. These are categorically and qualitatively distinct sorts of activities.
When courts lump them together under a single rubric it may undermine jurisprudential clarity,
transparency, and credibility, the very concerns that motivated Judge Leval’s articulation of the
transformative use principle in the first place (1990).
2.4.2 Scalability
Another concern stemming from the courts’ reasoning in Authors Guild v. HathiTrust concerns issues of
scalability. The trio of cases just discussed give rise to a potentially troubling inference that these
decisions may be custom-fit solutions only available to very large and/or powerful companies or
organizations. It is difficult to imagine how individual, small-scale, more modest, and/or more distributed
endeavors combining copyright infringement with a new technological tool could satisfy the implicit
requirement that the use result in a tremendous benefit to society. If we agree, however, that society can
and does benefit in important ways from the application of new technologies to existing cultural works (as
these cases demonstrate), then it makes sense to treat individual, small-scale, more modest, and/or more
distributed versions of this activity with a similar degree of deference, if not outright support. It may be
true that “quantity has a quality all its own,” but if courts limit the protections of fair use to massive scale
projects like those of HathiTrust and Google, we risk losing out on the societal benefits resulting from less
heroic, less visible, but still significant, endeavors.
2.4.3 Implications Under Other Laws
Related to this is the concern of what happens when it is not copyright law but some other set of legal
rules that is applied to the activity. In those instances, fair use would not be an option. Take for example,
the much publicized activity of Aaron Swartz. Swartz entered a computer lab at MIT without permission
and systematically downloaded a substantial portion of JSTOR’s archive. It is not entirely clear what his
intentions were but it is presumed that he planned to make the materials more widely accessible or, at the
minimum, raise awareness around the issue of access to scholarly works. As a result, the United States’
Department of Justice indicted him on two counts of wire fraud and eleven violations of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, carrying a cumulative maximum penalty of $1 million in fines and 35 years in
6
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prison. While those charges were ultimately dismissed after Swartz’s suicide two years later, the case
highlights the fact that emerging technology-enabled activities are often not restricted to the copyright law
domain. There is no fair use defense to wire fraud or violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18
U.S.C. §1030). Despite one’s views on Swartz’s particular activities, this example highlights society’s
uncertain, evolving view of how to treat people who allegedly break the law by copying protected works
“not to enrich themselves, but to make [the works] available to others.” It is not clear that the existing
legal regime offers a satisfactory response to this uncertainty (Associated Press, 2013). This suggests
that potential resolution of the phenomenon discussed herein will require a policy solution that is not
strictly limited to copyright law but consists of a set of principles with broader applicability.

3

Innovative Deviance: An Emerging Theoretical Framework

Thus far, this paper has explored aspects of the complicated, often murky intersection between copyright
law, technological change, and emerging behavior. The paper discussed some of the broader policy
concerns stemming from the widely-perceived miscalibration of copyright law’s means-end formulation
and discussed judicial approaches to recalibration using existing fair use doctrine, focusing on a particular
behavior, mass digitization, in the context of an exemplar case, Authors Guild v. HathiTrust. Those
sections illustrated the challenges and limitations inherent in attempts to stretch existing copyright laws -premised on a past technical reality -- to fit the contours of emerging behaviors.
In this section, the paper steps back from current policy debates and litigation around mass
digitization to focus on the broader, somewhat paradoxical, phenomenon: changes in technology enable
the emergence of new copyright-related behaviors that have the potential to promote the overriding goal
of copyright through the use of unorthodox, illegitimate, and/or infringing means. Engaging sociological
literature on deviance, this section begins to articulate an emerging theoretical framework for
understanding the interplay between copyright law, technological change, and emerging behavior based
upon social disorganization and structural strain theory. By offering a glimpse into the phenomenon via
this new and different lens, this section hopes to expand our understanding phenomenon and potentially
enrich existing discourse on copyright and technological change.

3.1 Social Disorganization Theory
Technological innovation has long been recognized by sociologists as a catalyst for transgressive or
deviant behavior. For example, in the 1920s the Chicago School posited that rapid technological change
damages society’s web of normative controls resulting in normative dissensus and social disorganization.
Over the short-term, these theorists argued that the natural by-product of social disorganization is
deviance; people break the rules. Over the long-term, deviance would be reclassified as “normative
competition” which, in their view, should ultimately push society toward reorganization around new norms.
(Pfohl, 1994)
In the context of HathiTrust and mass digitization, social disorganization theory might suggest that
the significant advances in information technology previously discussed, particularly with respect to
network infrastructure development, the creation of standards and protocols, and improvements in
digitization at scale, disrupted the functionality, credibility, and relevance of existing copyright rules
governing how intellectual and creative works are created, shared, organized, and disseminated. The
possibilities inherent in digitization at scale fundamentally altered the context of institutional sensemaking
and decision-making around copyright issues and led several major research institutions to engage in a
mass digitization project that potentially exposed them to hundreds of millions of dollars in damages. As
the still-active litigations stemming from the Google Library Project can attest, we are still in the process of
reorganizing the flux.
While social disorganization theory offers some insights into the relationship between
technological change and deviance, one drawback is that it does not distinguish between kinds of
deviance. In particular, it makes no distinction between deviance that may be beneficial or productive for
society versus non-utilitarian or destructive deviance. A different but I would argue complimentary theory
of deviance developed by Robert K. Merton in his 1938 book, Social Structure and Anomie, offers some
additional insights on this point.

3.2 Structural Strain Theory
Instead of focusing on rapid technological change as the primary catalyst for deviance, Merton’s premise
was that deviance is a natural by-product of structured inequalities in society, namely a mismatch
between accepted cultural goals and the availability of legitimate means to accomplish those goals. In
the context of this research, copyright law’s means-end formulation can be understood as a structured
7
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inequality in two senses. First, the entire copyright system is, in essence, a structured inequality because
based upon state created and sanctioned monopolies for authors in the cultural and intellectual works
they create. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the widely-perceived imbalance or miscalibration
between the goal of copyright law and the means set forth to accomplish its goal also reflects a structured
inequality for purposes of Merton’s theory.
According to Merton, the mismatch between accepted cultural goals and the availability of
legitimate means to accomplish those goals pushes people toward deviance along one of four possible
paths:
•
•
•
•

Innovative deviance: goals are accepted but legitimate means are rejected or unavailable;
Ritualistic deviance: goals are rejected but legitimate means are accepted;
Retreatist deviance: goals are rejected and legitimate means are rejected or unavailable;
Rebellious deviance: both goals and means are rejected and “something better” is sought

HathiTrust’s mass digitization project could be understood as an example of innovative deviance
with respect to existing copyright law. Its primary progenitor, the University of Michigan, sought to
preserve, improve access to, and stimulate the creation of new intellectual and creative works by
permitting the unauthorized digital reproduction of its vast print collection. In essence, Michigan sought to
advance the goal of copyright by engaging in an activity that potentially constituted mass copyright
infringement. Although it was not referenced by the courts in the Authors Guild v. HathiTrust cases,
Merton’s theoretical framework might help explain, or provide additional context, for the courts’ rationale
when it suspended a conventional application of the fair use doctrine in recognition of HathiTrust’s
“invaluable contribution to the advancement of knowledge” (Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 2014, p. 93
quoting Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 2012, p. 460-464). In addition, it could help ameliorate the concerns
previously raised around scalability (where a fair use defense may be less likely to succeed) and the
application of other, non-copyright, laws (where fair use would not be available as a defense). An
expanded and more fully developed theory of innovative deviance could assist courts in reasoning
through future cases and articulating clear bases for decisions arising at the intersection of new
technological and emerging copyright-related behavior.
The innovative deviance framework might also provide guidance to lawmakers as they continue
to contemplate reforms to existing copyright law. If copyright law is miscalibrated with respect to
technological change and this has resulted in an imbalance or mismatch in copyright’s means-end
formulation then, according to Merton’s theory, deviance is an unavoidable consequence. The structural
inequalities in copyright law made manifest by significant changes in information technology effectively
push members of society toward infringement. The best response then for lawmakers, stakeholders, and
society more generally, at least in the short-term, would be to take a permissive or supportive stance
toward innovative deviance because, of the four possible paths of deviance articulated by Merton, it is the
only one that preserves and/or advances the goal of copyright. Innovative deviance, further described by
Merton as “the creative use of illegitimate means to advance an important legitimate end” (1938, p. 230)
is, in essence, utilitarian infringement. Merton’s theory would thus suggest that efforts to reform existing
copyright laws should, first and foremost, seek to strengthen and support the overriding goals of copyright
against the other (non-utilitarian) paths of deviance, and secondarily seek to expand the availability of
legitimate means to accomplish its goal by either reducing the scope and/or reach of the exclusive rights
(17 U.S.C. §106) or expanding the scope and/or reach of limitations to the exclusive rights (17 U.S.C.
§§107-112).

4

Conclusion

The economist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen wryly remarked, “It is not easy in any given case –
indeed it is at times impossible until the courts have spoken – to say whether [an activity] is an instance of
praiseworthy salesmanship or penitentiary offense” (as quoted in Merton, 1957, p. 195). These lines can
seem particularly blurred when the behavior at issue accomplishes an important and well-accepted
societal goal but uses illegitimate or infringing means to do so. By exploring the ways in which existing
copyright law and current policy debates intersect with emerging technology-enabled ways of creating,
organizing, managing, disseminating, and engaging with existing works, this research illustrates that the
distinction between an “invaluable contribution to the progress of science and cultivation of the arts” and
copyright infringement is not always self-evident or easy to explain via conventional legal methods. This
observation is further supported by an in-depth discussion and analysis of mass digitization in the context
of the recent HathiTrust litigation and, in particular, the courts’ reliance on existing fair use doctrine to
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support what may have ultimately been a policy-based decision. Finally, by drawing upon sociological
theories on technological change and deviance, this research begins to articulate a theoretical framework
for re-conceptualizing the interplay between copyright law and technological change. This research
suggests that innovative deviance might provides a framework within which existing laws can learn to
change in step with technological change. Viewing the phenomenon via this new lens, this research
hopes to deepen current understandings, enrich existing discourse, and ignite renewed reflection of this
complex, murky, yet important topic.
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